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ABSTRACT 
This article reexamines the thesis that fiscal deficits cause trade deficits and challenges 
this explanation of the twin deficits with the following propositions. Differences in 
competitiveness among nations do not lead to balanced trade. Using a Eurozone case 
study, the article discusses the nexus between competitiveness and the trade balance. 
Secondly, the author proposes that causality runs from trade deficits to fiscal deficits 
when the free trade-balanced trade theory is overthrown, and finally, the article 
overturns the argument that austerity works.   
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Introduction 
The twin deficits debate that emerged in the late 1970s has regained traction in recent 
times since the Eurozone crisis and the debt ceiling debates in the USA. The 
neoclassical economic contention is that imprudent government spending causes trade 
deficits: thus, public deficits and debt are the offenders responsible for the Eurozone 
trade imbalances, the USA’s trade deficits and global imbalances generally.  
Empirical tests are inconclusive.  Some (Abell 1990:81-96; and Volcker 1984:4-9) show 
that fiscal deficits cause trade deficits, while others (Summers 1988:349-375; and 
Reisen 1998) indicate the reverse causality. Yet, austerity policies are advanced as if 
they rest on an uncontested theoretical and empirical foundation. This article challenges 
the orthodoxy and uses a simple model and a Eurozone case study to show that 
international differences in competitiveness (based on real unit labor costs and the 
complexity of exports) lead to unbalanced trade.  This crucial insight overturns the 
neoclassical reasoning, since the latter explanation of a twin-deficit relationship rests 
firmly on the free trade-balanced trade theory. The popular story is that, because trade 
balances naturally, any imbalances can only be explained by fiscal imprudence. But 
when imbalances are the natural outcome of trade among differently abled countries, 
fiscal deficits cannot adequately explain these imbalances. Therefore, this article 
contradicts the neoclassical view.  It contends that public deficits and household debt 
are unfortunate consequences of trade deficits because government outlays tend to 
increase, stabilizing income and employment, as trade deficits increase.  
This debate around these issues is important because of the impact its policy 
implications could have on the global economy and how it is managed in the future. 
Overturning the free trade theory and the mainstream economists’ explanation of the 
twin deficits contradicts the claim that austerity is necessary. Using a simple model, this 
article demonstrates how austerity measures can reduce cyclical trade deficits but at the 
cost of higher unemployment and indebtedness. Knowing the difference between 
cyclical and structural trade balances is crucial in understanding why austerity gives a 
false sense of adjustment. Structural balances are underpinned by competitiveness, 
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while the cyclical trade balances adjust with income. But suppressing income to shrink 
trade deficits is neither the solution when trade deficits are structural, nor is it humane. 
Austerity is not the appropriate policy to adjust structural trade deficits.  
Some previous studies, such as Nikiforos et al (2013:17), support the line of causation 
proposed here, but there are important differences. For instance, Nikiforos et al (2013:2) 
explain that the source of imbalances in Greece is the Euro, unlike the contention in this 
article that differences in competitiveness are the key problem. Similarly, Krugman 
(2013) claims that imbalances in Europe could be eliminated if the Eurozone countries 
had independent currencies: but this article explains that this adjustment mechanism is 
dependent on the assumptions of Say’s Law and high price and income elasticities of 
demand for exports and imports respectively. When these latter assumptions are 
relaxed, the adjustment mechanism fails to operate and trade imbalances persist.  
So how can global imbalances be prevented? Keynes suggested an International 
Clearing Union but this would not prevent imbalances when the source of the 
imbalances is differences in competitiveness. Rather, industrial policies are necessary 
to acquire the tacit knowledge and technology needed to improve competitiveness. 
Nations with highly ubiquitous export portfolios and/or relatively high real unit labor cost 
need space to elevate their productivity and the technology content of their exports. 
Trade arrangements that fail to compensate for competitive differences create future 
crises of debt, trade imbalances and high unemployment.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The first section discusses free 
trade theory and its assumptions, along with the neoclassical explanation of the twin 
deficits and a brief review of empirical studies. The second section explains how 
competitiveness determines the trade balance, using a simple model and a Eurozone 
case study, and ends by reformulating the twin deficits relationship. The third section 
explains why fiscal austerity is ineffective in solving structural trade deficits. A 
concluding section summarizes the argument.  
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Free Trade and its Assumptions 
Consider two countries, A and B, with absolute advantage and disadvantage in all 
commodities traded, respectively. When trade is undertaken, country A experiences an 
inflow of foreign currency (or gold in David Ricardo’s original analysis) while country B 
experiences an outflow. Employing the crude quantity theory of money, as Ricardo did, 
country A and B experience inflation and deflation respectively, until country A loses its 
absolute advantage in some commodities and country B gains in others. The real 
exchange rate adjusts to reflect the price changes in both countries until trade balances. 
These price changes supposedly mirror differences in comparative costs or result in 
absolute advantage reversals. Essentially, price changes are used as the adjustment 
mechanism that ensures balanced trade.   
The above analysis was undertaken with the assumption that capital flows only affect 
inflation. But when we account for how interest rates are determined these money flows 
alter relative interest rates and generate an income adjustment mechanism. Using 
Keynes’ theory of the rate of interest, these money flows cause a decrease in the rate of 
interest for country A and an increase for country B. Relatively lower interest rates in 
country A increase aggregate income through higher investment expenditure, which in 
turn increases imports or reduces the trade surplus. The reverse is true for country B 
that has higher interest rates, lower aggregate income and imports, and thus, an 
improved trade balance. This income adjustment mechanism delineates how the 
cyclical trade balance adjusts over the phases of the business cycle, which is different 
from structural trade balance that cannot adjust through the income or price adjustment 
mechanisms. 
Mundell (1961:657-665) explained that currency unions or countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes would lose the price adjustment mechanism that balances trade 
when wages and prices are rigid. Factor mobility was said to be the essential 
adjustment mechanism that balances trade. Singh (2008:12), for example, argues that, 
since Guyana implemented its Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1988, labor 
migration served as the adjustment mechanism that improved its trade balance. Indeed, 
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Guyana’s exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar; and migration and remittance 
flows intensified following the implementation of the (ERP). Singh (2008:12) explains 
that remittances have two principal effects:  
• they serve as a source of deficit financing; and  
• they reduce the demand for imports when much of the remittances are in kind.  
On this reasoning the adjustment mechanisms that balance trade ensure that free trade 
is beneficial for all. The essential benefit is that losers (countries with trade deficits) 
become winners as trade surplus countries become losers, through any of the 
adjustment mechanisms that balance trade. An equilibrium is thereby established. But 
this story is built on the assumptions of Say’s Law and no money flow reversals, both of 
which are relaxed below. Finally, high price elasticity of demand for exports/imports and 
high-income elasticity of demand for exports/imports are necessary conditions for the 
price and income adjustment mechanisms to balance trade. When these do not hold, 
trade imbalances are entrenched and the argument for free trade is severely weakened.  
The price adjustment mechanism implicitly assumes full employment: otherwise, an 
income adjustment mechanism would balance trade. This is why Say’s Law is an 
important foundation of free trade theory, explaining that any excess supply of goods 
will automatically readjust with price changes. Popularly known as ‘supply creates its 
own demand’, Say’s Law ensures that aggregate demand (AD) equals aggregate 
supply (AS) at a unique equilibrium of full employment (Keynes 1936:26). The latter is a 
necessary condition that ensures the price adjustment mechanism is feasible.  When 
Say’s Law is relaxed, however, this paves the way for an income adjustment 
mechanism to balance trade. 
As stated earlier, the efficacy of the price adjustment mechanism also requires relatively 
high price elasticity of demand for exports/imports: otherwise, price changes would be 
insufficient to adjust trade imbalances. For instance, trade deficit countries that export 
primary commodities with relatively low price elasticity of demand can hardly improve 
their trade balances with lower export prices. This elasticity perspective is the source of 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis that explains why commodity-producing countries 
experience declining terms of trade (Prebisch 1950:1-12; and Singer 1950:473-485). As 
5	  
	  
such, we expect persistent trade imbalances when commodity-exporting countries 
undertake free trade with industrialized countries.  
Since a clear interest rate differential exists between countries A and B (where the latter 
has a relatively higher interest rate), money flow reverses and move from country A to B 
in pursuit of higher returns. This reverse in money flow prevents any trade imbalance 
from adjusting. Instead of a deflation in country B, the reverse money flow entrenches 
its absolute disadvantages through the price adjustment mechanism. But imbalances 
can still persist through the income adjustment mechanism. Instead of country A (with 
its relatively lower interest rate) boosting aggregate income and imports, capital outflow 
to country B would increase its interest rate and impede the income adjustment 
mechanism from offsetting trade imbalances. Although currency unions lose the price 
adjustment mechanism, the income adjustment mechanism is available to balance 
trade, but this is subject to the critique above.  
Relaxing the assumptions of Say’s Law and no money flow reversals explain why free 
trade will not lead to balanced trade, contrary to the mainstream economists’ contention. 
Imbalances between Northern and Southern Europe, China and the USA - and global 
imbalances generally - should not be regarded as anomalies or the inevitable 
consequence of fiscal mismanagement. Rather, as Harvey (1996:567-83) says: ‘Trade 
imbalances have not been automatically eliminated, not in the developing world, not 
even in the developed world, not in the past, not in the present, not under fixed 
exchange rates, not under flexible exchange rates’. 
Twin Deficits 
Some simple modelling can help to explain the key variables and relationships. 
Equation 1 below is a basic national accounting identity where national savings NS( )  
less investment I( )  or net capital outflow is equal to the trade balance or exports X( )  
less imports M( ) . A positive net capital outflow NS  >  I( )  indicates that the nation is a 
net lender in world financial markets; and basic accounting necessitates that the trade 
balance X  –  M( )  adjusts to maintain the identity, as equation (2) illustrates. Equation 
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(3) depicts the popular twin deficits relationship when the nation is a net borrower 
NS  <  I( )  in world markets. These identities have no causal implications but 
nonetheless point to a correlation between net capital outflow NS  –  I( )  and the trade 
balance X  –  M( ) . 
NS  –  I  =  X  –  M  1( )
NS  >  I  =  X  >  M  2( )
NS  <  I  =  X  <  M  3( )        
 
The mainstream economists’ contention is that causation runs from left to right.  On the 
reasoning, fiscal deficits result in a shortfall in domestic savings NS  <  I( ) , which ignites 
foreign borrowing and, consequently, causes a trade deficit X  <  M( ) . However, this 
reasoning is subject to two qualifications:  
• if the reduction in government savings due to fiscal expansion is fully offset by a 
rise in private savings, then the trade balance remains unchanged (which is 
known as the Ricardo-Barro Equivalence theorem).  
• if a reduction in national saving NS( )  is fully offset by a fall in private investment, 
then the trade balance is unaffected (known as the Feldstein-Horioka theorem). 
 Given these two qualifications, equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
Sp –  I p( )  +  Sg –  Ig( )  =  X  –  M( )  4( )  
where Sp( ),  I p( ),  Sg( )  and Ig( )  are private savings and investment and government 
savings and investment, respectively. The validity of the Ricardo-Barro Equivalence 
theorem is questioned because individuals have a limited lifetime and may choose to 
increase consumption (or reduce savings), though government undertakes deficit 
spending. As regards the validity of the Feldstein-Horioka theorem, households either 
face strict capital controls and/or simply lack a preference for foreign capital, both of 
which are doubtful in a world of highly mobile capital.  
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The Mundell-Fleming model explains the twin deficits relationship by arguing that fiscal 
deficits cause trade deficits. The essential argument is that a budget deficit in one 
country increases its interest rates relative to the rest of the world, which encourages 
capital inflow that appreciates its exchange rate (in a floating exchange rate regime). 
The higher exchange rate reduces net exports and deteriorates the country’s net trade 
balance X  –  M( ) . Alternatively, when the exchange rate regime is fixed, the fiscal 
expansion is accommodated by monetary expansion, which offsets the initial increase in 
interest rates. The result is an increase in aggregate income (through deficit spending) 
and imports, which erodes the trade balance X  –  M( )  through the income adjustment 
mechanism.  
The Mundell-Fleming model uses the trade-balanced theory (or a world where price, 
income or factor inputs adjust to balance trade) as its underlying theoretical foundation. 
Logical deduction then dictates that any trade imbalance could only be explained by 
fiscal imbalances. But trade accompanies money flow across countries that inevitably 
alter relative interest rates. It is these relatively higher interest rates in trade deficit 
countries, as compared to trade surplus countries, that ignite capital flows (to trade 
deficit countries) and consequently cement trade imbalances independent of fiscal 
balances.  
Notwithstanding its flawed free trade theoretical basis, the Mundell-Fleming explanation 
of the twin deficits relationship was given empirical support by Volcker (1984:4-9) and 
Abell (1990:81-96) for the USA in the late 1980s. Hutchinson and Pigott (1984:5-25), 
Zietz and Pemberton (1990:23-34), Bacham (1992:232-240), Erceg et al (2005:232-
240) and Bartolini and Larhiri (2006) also established the same line of causation for 
OECD countries. Chinn and Prasad (2003:232-240) argue that the Mundell-Fleming 
explanation holds for both developed and developing countries. However empirical 
support for the reverse causality was generated by Summers (1988:349-375). Reisen 
(1998) and Khalid and Teo (1999:389-402) also argued that there is empirical evidence 
that supports the reverse causality of the twin deficits in developing countries in the 80s 
and 90s, while Alkswani (2000:26-29) suggested that the reverse causality holds for 
commodity exporting countries, since the trade balance directly affects fiscal revenues.  
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A number of other studies have posited bi-directional causality, implying that both fiscal 
and trade balances affect each other. Darrat (1988:879-886) and Hatemi and Shukur 
(2002:817-824) showed bi-directional causality for the USA. Islam (1998:121-128) and 
Normandin (1999:171-193) confirmed the same for Brazil and Canada respectively; 
while Baharumshah et al (2006:331-354) established similar findings for Malaysia and 
the Philippines, though Anoruo and Ramchander (1998:487-501) indicated uni-
directional causality from trade deficits to fiscal deficits. Other studies, such as Miller 
and Russek (1989:91-115) and Rahman and Mishra (1992:119-127), confirm the 
Ricardo-Barro Equivalence theorem, but these studies are difficult to reconcile with 
recent evidence of both fiscal and private deficits leading to the global financial crisis.  
We cannot reasonably infer that the verdict is out on the direction of causation. 
However, the recent push for austerity measures in Europe implies otherwise. So does 
the recommendation in the IMF (1999) Balance of Payments (BOP) Manual that 
contractionary fiscal policies (among others) could solve balance of payments crises. 
Even Rodrik (2013) argues that the real heroes of the global economy are countries like 
Austria, Canada, the Philippines, Lesotho and Uruguay, since they do not over-borrow 
or sustain a mercantilist economic model. Similarly, Krugman (2013) argues that 
Germany’s trade surplus is responsible for a substantial part of global demand 
slowdown, because the source of its trade surplus is its excess of savings relative to its 
investment. Additional blame is also attributed to the fact that Germany does not have 
an independent currency: otherwise, its exchange rate would simply appreciate to 
ensure that its trade balance adjusts. But this argument is subject to the same critique 
of the price adjustment mechanism. Furthermore, Krugman (2013) recommends 
boosting aggregate demand in Germany to reduce its trade surplus, but this suggestion 
falls victim to the same criticisms against the income adjustment mechanism. Even if 
the latter were effective, it would only adjust Germany’s cyclical trade balance. If much 
of Germany’s trade surplus is structural, Krugman’s advice is palliative at best and 
completely ineffective in a worst-case scenario.    
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Competitiveness and the Trade Balance 
Contrary to the mainstream economists’ contention, my argument is that the fiscal 
balance does not regulate the trade balance. On the contrary, it is competitiveness that 
determines the balance of trade. But what is competitiveness? The Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) of the World Economic Forum defines it as the 
institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. But 
Lall (2001:1501-1525) argues that this definition is too broad and that the methodology 
in calculating the indices is flawed, such that these weak theoretical and empirical 
foundations reduce the value of the indices for any analytical purposes and 
policymaking.  
Competitiveness is defined here, rather more specifically, as the ability of a nation to 
seize opportunities and subdue costs in an increasingly integrated global environment, 
through the use of institutions that improve productivity in sophisticated goods/services. 
From this view, two pillars of competitiveness emerge:  
• productivity, particularly labor productivity; and  
• technological content or the degree of sophistication of goods/services.  
Real unit labor costs could be defined as: wages per hour/labor productivity. Therefore, 
as productivity rises relative to wages, real unit labor costs fall, and vice versa. But the 
competitive gains from reducing real unit labor costs are limited, especially if the product 
mix of a country’s exports is ubiquitous and built with simple technology. This 
challenges Krugman (2010), who argues that internal devaluation or reductions in unit 
labor costs is the only sensible way to eliminate the effects of asymmetric shocks within 
the Euro. But the sophistication of a country’s exports is equally important for 
competitiveness. Besides, Krugman’s suggestion could make matters worse: if 
aggregate demand in Southern Eurozone countries is wage led, internal devaluation 
would reduce consumption and aggregate income while increasing unemployment and 
debt to GDP ratios.   
The PRODY index developed by Hausmann et al (2007:1-25) approximates the 
revealed technology content of a product by a weighted average of GDP per capita of 
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the exporting countries. The PRODY index describes the income level associated with a 
product and gives more weight to countries with a revealed comparative advantage in 
that product. Thus, high-income countries can be expected to export goods with 
relatively higher technology content. At the country level, the Economic Complexity 
index (Hidalgo and Hausmann 2009:10570-10575) measures diversification and 
ubiquity, while EXPY (Hausmann et al 2007:1-25) scores indicate the income level 
associated with a particular export basket. These measures are highly correlated with 
per capita income and growth. Countries that are relatively more competitive possess 
greater technological capabilities and knowledge (formal and tacit), which increase the 
degree of complexity and the range of goods/services that can be produced. This has 
been the justification for industrial policies or selective state intervention to accelerate 
technological accumulation and development.  
A Simple Model 
Consider two countries, Alpha and Beta, which export goods X  and Y  respectively. 
Country Alpha possesses greater technological capabilities: therefore, good X  is a 
sophisticated commodity with high complexity.  The reverse is true for country Beta and 
good Y . The level of wages Wa( )  and productivity in country Alpha determine the real 
unit labor costs W *a( ) . We assume that country Beta has a lower wage rate Wb <  Wa( )  
but even lower productivity, giving a relatively higher real unit labor cost of W *b >  W *a( ) .  
Let Px  denote the price of good X  in terms of Y  or the terms of trade of country Alpha. 
Conversely, the price Py  of good Y  is 1/ Px . These differences in terms of trade are 
attributed to differences in the technology content of commodities and real unit labor 
costs. In this simple model, the basis for trade is differences in technology or 
competitiveness, which cause export prices and export baskets to differ.  
When free trade is undertaken between these countries a clear trade imbalance 
emerges PxXa >  1 / Px( )  Yb( ) , where Xa  and  Yb  are the quantities of goods X  and Y  
respectively and are non-zero. If we assume that countries Alpha and Beta have their 
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own currencies, the price adjustment mechanism is available to balance trade. But this 
is impeded by price differentials that are underpinned by differences in competitiveness. 
Since the price adjustment mechanism assumes Say’s Law (contrary to our earlier 
criticisms) and the factor mobility adjustment is only viable in currency unions, then the 
income adjustment mechanism is the only way to balance trade. However, as the first 
main section of this article explains, capital moves from surplus countries to trade deficit 
countries: thus, trade imbalances persist. Consequently, we can posit the following:  
PROPOSITON 1: Free trade among countries with differences in competitiveness does 
not lead to balanced trade.  
Accordingly, we can expect trade imbalances between North and Southern Europe to 
persist, since nations within the Eurozone have experienced a divergence in 
competitiveness. Similarly, extensive trade liberalization of the world economy can be 
expected to create chronic global imbalances, as is evident today.  
If we assume factor price equalization, then wages would tend to be the same in all 
countries, but real unit labor costs can still vary because of differences in technology 
and productivity. Technology transfer in trade is a fact, but only formal and codified 
knowledge is disseminated from the center to the periphery. Inevitably, gaps in tacit 
knowledge not only exist but also tend to persist; since many Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) outlaw industrial policies that government might otherwise implement to acquire 
that tacit knowledge for local industries.  
A Eurozone Case Study 
Figure 1 tells a striking story about the Eurozone crisis and highlights the divergence 
between the North (surplus nations) and the South (deficit nations). Evidently, trade 
imbalances have long been a part of the Eurozone story, but they became chronic after 
2002. Figure 2 showing unit labor costs for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal takes us closer to an explanation. After 2002, unit labor costs escalated in 
Southern Europe, with the largest increase observed in Greece. By contrast, Germany’s 
labor cost increases have been modest when compared to its Southern counterparts. 
Thus, a clear divergence in competitiveness between Germany and Southern Europe is 
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observed, mirroring the worsening trade imbalances from 2002 to 2008 shown in Figure 
1.  
Figure 1: Intra-Eurozone trade balances 
 
Source: Kosteletou (2011:11). 
Note: The trade deficit countries are Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Luxemburg, Cyprus, Malta and 
Slovenia with other Eurozone countries. The trade surplus countries with other Eurozone countries are Germany, 
Belgium, Ireland, Holland and Slovakia. 
	  
Figure 2: Unit Labor costs for selected Eurozone countries 
 
Source: www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/image/mickey_fig1.gif - data source: Eurostat.  
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Figure 3 strengthens the argument that a competitive divergence exists, as productivity 
improvements were slower in Southern Europe, especially Italy, when compared to 
Germany. Although the rate of productivity growth increase has evidently been below 
the rate of increase in labor costs in Germany in recent years, the two have moved 
more-or-less in tandem over the whole time period shown. By contrast, in France, 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, the costs of labor have steadily outstripped the slow 
productivity growth. In spite of Greece’s substantial productivity growth until 2008, its 
competitiveness has been eroded due to escalating labor costs. The divergence 
between the cost of labor and productivity shown in Figure 3 has also mirrored the 
increasing divide between surplus and deficit countries shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 3: Productivity and Labor costs for selected Eurozone countries 
 
Source: www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/image/mickey_fig3.gif - data source: Eurostat.  
It is often argued that a common currency regime prevents the price adjustment 
mechanism from working: hence, the Euro has been blamed for entrenched trade 
imbalances. To assess this hypothesis, Figure 4 highlights the year in which selected 
Eurozone countries joined the Euro, as indicated by the vertical line in each graph. 
Interestingly, each of the countries had current account imbalances prior to their 
adoption of the Euro, in spite of the fact that they all had independent currencies. Figure 
4 also depicts the correlation between these current account imbalances and the public 
deficits for the selected economies.  The correlation looks weak. Both Italy and France 
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had current account surpluses in many years even though their public accounts were in 
deficit. Generally, however, the selected countries experience both current account 
deficits and fiscal deficits over the time period studied here, although there is no clear 
evidence of any consistent year-by-year association between the two.  
Figure 4: Twin Deficits for selected Eurozone countries 
 
Source: Kosteletou (2011:9). Note: the solid vertical line indicates the year that the Euro was adopted. 
To what extent has the varying sophistication of exports contributed to the divergence in 
competitiveness and the worsening of trade imbalances? Table 1 illustrates the 
Economic Complexity and EXPY indices for Eurozone countries, China, Japan and the 
USA. It is evident that Germany and the remainder of the surplus countries have higher 
ECI and EXPY scores, as compared to Greece, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus. Although 
France, Italy and Austria have recently been trade deficit countries, they have similar 
ECI and EXPY scores to the trade surplus countries. We may infer that differences in 
real unit labor costs could explain the competitiveness gaps between the nations. 
Indeed it is no surprise that Greece, Portugal and Spain are burdened with substantial 
trade imbalances (as shown in Figure 4), since they export few complex goods and are 
relatively less diversified. These countries score poorly on the two pillars of 
competitiveness and, as proposition 1 suggests, they endure chronic trade imbalances. 
Improving labor productivity within these countries would enhance their international 
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competitiveness, but this cannot be sustained unless they diversify and upgrade the 
technological content of their exports. Greece’s top five exports are: refined petroleum, 
packaged medicaments, aluminum plating, non-fillet fish and copper pipes. Germany’s 
main exports are: cars, vehicle parts, packaged medicaments, planes, helicopters and 
spacecraft. 11% of Greece’s imports come from Germany, making up the largest part of 
its import bill. 
Table 1: Measures of Diversification (ECI) and Incomes for a Particular Export 
Basket (EXPY) for Selected Countries 
COUNTRY ECI 2010 EXPY 2010 
GERMANY 1.76 20518.92 
SWEDEN 1.62 20545.04 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 1.54 18723.02 
FINLAND 1.52 20920.42 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 1.51 19542.34 
AUSTRIA 1.49 19992.51 
BELGIUM – 
LUXEMBOURG 1.39 19111.67 
FRANCE 1.39 20104.39 
SLOVENIA 1.35 18914.48 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 1.30 18032.51 
NETHERLANDS 1.28 18447.67 
HUNGRARY 1.28 18584.14 
ITALY 1.23 18701.91 
IRELAND 1.23 24734.78 
DENMARK 1.17 19762.23 
POLAND 1.12 17429.08 
SPAIN 1.02 18249.39 
MALTA 0.99 17950.39 
ESTONIA 0.86 16430.41 
CYPRUS 0.83 17371.78 
ROMANIA 0.80 15654.90 
LATVIA 0.78 15888.44 
LITHUANIA 0.73 15608.11 
PORTUGAL 0.68 16292.15 
BULGARIA 0.65 13699.65 
GREECE 0.51 15540.75 
CHINA 0.98 17058.99 
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JAPAN 1.99 21313.27 
USA 1.55 20030.19 
 Source: Reinstaller et al (2012:28). 
To digress briefly, Papadimitriou et al (2013:1-20) and Shaikh et al (2003:1-16) explain 
that the decline in the USA’s current account coincides with a downturn in 
manufacturing as a share of value added in the economy. This de-industrialization is 
indicative of the loss in competitiveness in industry. Papadimitriou et al (2013:1-20) 
argue that, unless the stagnation in US manufacturing is reversed, the erosion of its 
competitiveness will continue. They propose an increase in R&D investment in export 
sectors to reduce unit costs for producers, arguing that this could return the USA to its 
competitive position in the high technology sector.  It is a line of reasoning that is 
consistent with the arguments made in the Eurozone case study. 
Shaikh et al (2003a:1-16) demonstrate that Japan, Germany and China are the three 
main contributors to the USA’s current account deficit. As Table 1 illustrates, both 
Germany and Japan have higher ECI and EXPY scores than the USA, indicative of their 
superior competitiveness. Although China scores poorly on these measures as 
compared to the USA, Shaikh et al (2003a) explain that China accounts for the greater 
part of the USA’s current account deficit, revealing its advantage in the real unit cost of 
labor.  
Similarly, Montoute (2013:110-126) explains that Caricom1 countries have endured an 
increasing trade deficit with China since 2001. China’s top ten products are finished 
manufactures, while Caricom’s top ten exports are raw materials – indicating a striking 
competitive gap. But Caricom’s trade misery does not end with China, as the customs 
union has also experienced trade deficits with the USA and EU since 2001. There were 
exceptional years like 2006 when Caricom benefited from a trade surplus with the USA, 
but the region is generally at a competitive disadvantage, similar to the Southern 
Eurozone countries.  
ECLAC (2012:114) explains that trade between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
and the USA, EU, Asia and the Pacific reflects reprimarization (the tendency to export 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  A customs union of mostly Small Island Caribbean states. 	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primarily agricultural commodities) on the part of LAC.  The same publication illustrates 
that productivity growth has been completely absent in LAC for the period of 1980-2010, 
while productivity tripled in Asia. LAC has been fortunate since the mid-2000s because 
the commodity price boom favorably influenced their terms of trade, but it is likely to be 
in a precarious position when commodity prices stabilize.  
Kassim (2013) has investigated the impact of trade liberalization on export and import 
growth across 28 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1981 to 2010. The research, 
based on panel data, concludes that, following liberalization, the trade balance 
deteriorated for the sample countries. Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004:F50-F72) 
drew the same conclusion for 22 developing countries from 1972 to 1998. An 
investigation conducted by Santos-Paulino (2007:972-998) for 17 least developed 
countries from 1970 to 2001 confirmed that this finding is robust.  As proposition 1 
explains, when competitiveness is asymmetrical, liberalization of the world economy 
tends to create chronic trade imbalances.  
Twin Deficits and Causality 
Some further modelling can held to show the nature of the twin deficits relationship.  
Equation (5) explains the normal situation where actual income Y '( )  is less than full 
employment income Y *( ) , being made up of government outlays G( ) , consumption 
C( ) , investment I( )  and net exports NX( ) . Following proposition 1, we expect the trade 
deficit NX  <  0( )  and the economy’s slack Y '  <  Y *( )  to intensify for country Beta, 
while the reverse is true for country Alpha. We assume that the output elasticity of 
unemployment is relatively low for country Alpha so that increases in Y 'due to an 
increasing trade surplus NX  >  0( )  do not incite wage increases. We also assume that 
wages are sticky downwards, so that an increasing output gap Y '  <  Y *( )  does not 
manifest itself in lower wages in country Beta.  
Y '  <  Y *  =  G  +  C  +  I  +  NX  5( )  
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As the output gap increases (due to an increasing trade deficit NX  <  0( ) ) in country 
Beta, national income falls along with C( ) , NS( )  and tax revenues T( ) . This leads to 
the following position, where Y ''  <  Y '( ) :  
Y ''  <  Y *  =  G  >  T( )  +  C  +  NS  <  I( )  –  NX  6( )  
Equation (6) illustrates the situation of a public deficit G  >  T( )  resulting from a 
downward (automatic) adjustment of tax revenue T( )  and national saving NS( ) . We can 
expect the public deficit G  >  T( )  to increase as the trade deficit NX  <  0( )  worsens. It 
is through the automatic and discretionary stabilization mechanisms that government 
outlays become endogenous and respond to shocks in the trade balance. The reverse 
argument could be made for country Alpha that experiences an increase in its trade 
surplus NX  >  0( ) , tax revenue T( )  and national saving NS( ) .  Through automatic 
stabilizers, Alpha’s fiscal position becomes a surplus G  <  T( )  and the country 
becomes a net lender NS  >  I( )  in world markets. This leads us to the following 
proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2: Causality runs from trade deficits to fiscal deficits. 
This implies that fiscal balances endogenously adjust to trade balances, which 
undermines the fiscal sovereignty of nation states. This should caution against the 
embrace of many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and further integration of trading 
blocs. 
As highlighted earlier, there is empirical support for Proposition 2, but this hardly gets us 
anywhere as the reverse causality also has some empirical support. To settle the issue, 
one has to investigate the theoretical foundations of the various lines of causation. 
Conventional trade theory argues that the value of each nation’s imports and exports 
tends to balance irrespective of their initial competitiveness, but this reasoning is built 
on implausible assumptions, as argued earlier. Since competitiveness is not evenly 
distributed, trade imbalance is the general case and could not be caused by fiscal 
deficits.  
19	  
	  
Rodrik (1998:997-1032) explains that governments play a risk-reducing role for 
economies exposed to significant external risks, supporting the argument that causation 
runs from openness to government spending. To reduce endogeneity problems and 
extract the exogenous component of trade shares, Rodrik employs three different 
approaches to establish causality. He uses a measure called natural openness (instead 
of the standard measure of trade to GDP ratio), which captures the distance among 
major trading partners. Secondly, he employs a measure developed by Frankel and 
Romer (1996) that seeks to capture the geographical determinants of trade shares, 
using only bilateral trade data. Finally, an instrumental variables approach, based on 
population and distance, is used. Cross-country regressions on these three bases 
confirm the earlier findings of causation running from openness to the size of 
governments when the standard measure of openness (trade to GDP ratio) is 
employed. This supports Proposition 2 and the determination of trade imbalances 
independent of fiscal imbalances.  
Kearney and Fallick (1987) contend that fiscal restraint will not improve the trade 
balance unless accompanied by industrial initiatives aimed at improving the country’s 
structural weaknesses. The authors underscore the point that private savings and 
investment are not stable: ergo, fiscal consolidation is not the only adjustment 
mechanism to balance trade, unlike the neoclassical claim. The authors highlight the 
importance of the components of government spending (current and capital outlay) and 
contend that these have asymmetrical influence on the trade balance, an argument that 
is ignored in the neoclassical reasoning. Similar to Cuddington and Vinal (1986), the 
authors claim that the influence fiscal deficits have on the trade balance is dependent 
on how the deficit is financed, whether it be tax or loan financed.  
An extension of the causality debate is the argument that excessive savers and 
spenders are responsible for global imbalances. But let us reconsider equation (6), 
where trade deficits NX  <  0( )  reduce national income and national savings NS( ) . The 
fall of national savings NS( )  in trade deficit countries is the consequence of an increase 
in the output gap, as opposed to irresponsible governments or households. The reverse 
is true in trade surplus countries NX  >  0( ) , where national income and national savings 
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NS( )  are rising steadily. Hence, the presence of ‘excessive savers and spenders’ is an 
expected consequence of global imbalances (ceteris paribus). In trade deficit countries, 
households attempt to maintain their current standards of living by incurring debt, 
although employment and income are falling.  
Trade Deficits and Fiscal Austerity  
The popular argument that twin deficits are caused by fiscal mismanagement leads to 
one conventional policy conclusion – impose fiscal austerity. Equation (6) illustrates the 
budget deficit G  <  T( )  that austerity measures are supposed to eradicate, as in the 
cases of Greece and the IMF’s structural adjustment programs. Reductions in G( )  that 
are intended to balance the budget simultaneously reduce aggregate income, C( )  and 
NS( ) . That fall in national income would normally reduce imports and thus improve the 
cyclical trade deficit, but at a cost of higher unemployment.  Surely this is not the 
humane way to address global imbalances.  
Proponents of austerity contend that the austerity measures are expansionary since the 
cyclical trade balance improves. But any such expansionary effect must be weighed 
against the contractionary impulses of lower C( ) , G( )  and I( ) . Indeed, trade deficits 
have declined in the aftermath of austerity policies in Southern Europe, but this does not 
reflect improved competitiveness: it is the cyclical trade deficits that have improved at 
the cost of unemployment. This leads us to proposition 3: 
PROPOSITION 3: Fiscal austerity cannot solve structural trade deficits.  
This claim rests on the foundation of Propositions 1 and 2. As such, unless fiscal 
austerity improves competitiveness, structural trade deficits will persist. Moreover, it is 
unlikely that budget cuts in education, health care, infrastructure and other social 
spending will enhance competitiveness and reduce trade imbalances, especially in 
times of high unemployment.  
The idea of austerity is founded on a flawed theory that leaves only one explanation for 
trade imbalances – irresponsible governments. Proponents of austerity argue that the 
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reduction of debt should be the first order of business. Of course, trade deficit countries 
are net borrowers, so high indebtedness is expected, but the use of austerity measures 
tends to increase the debt to GDP ratio and make the problem worse. The problem of 
debt will continue, unless the structural imbalances are addressed by reducing the gaps 
in competitiveness among nations. Meanwhile, austerity measures are deeply socially 
unpopular, as shown by protests on the streets of Europe.  
Conclusion 
Overthrowing orthodox economic trade theory strikes the hardest blow against the 
popular explanation of the twin deficits. This article proposes that free trade among 
nations with differences in competitiveness does not lead to balanced trade, and that 
causality runs from trade deficits to fiscal deficits. When we understand that trade 
imbalances are not anomalies but the general outcome of trade among countries that 
are differently abled, one cannot convincingly argue that fiscal imprudence causes 
these imbalances. This article has sought to show the flaws in the mainstream 
reasoning and explains why fiscal austerity cannot solve structural trade deficits. The 
reasoning that excessive spending and savings are the root causes of global 
imbalances has also been challenged and overturned through the use of a simple 
model that delineates why these are inevitable outcomes from unbalanced trade.   
In the European case, there is a clear divergence in competitiveness between North 
and Southern countries that drives the imbalances. In the German case, its real unit 
labor costs are lower than the Southern Eurozone countries and its exports are highly 
complex and sophisticated. Southern European countries, particularly Greece, need to 
diversify and upgrade the technology content of their exports. For countries like France 
that export sophisticated goods like others in the North, reductions in real unit labor 
costs can contribute to regaining competitiveness, but this cannot be done unless 
industrial policies are accommodated.  
These findings have far reaching implications for academics and policy makers alike, 
especially at a time when countries are affected by chronic trade imbalances, debt and 
high unemployment. The proposition that differences in competitiveness matter for trade 
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forces us to rethink the global trading architecture and helps us understand the role that 
trade liberalization (or integration) plays in today’s global and regional imbalances. The 
Eurozone crisis should be a lesson for trading blocs everywhere: its continuing 
problems represent the epitome of the flawed theory that trade always balances. A 
reconstruction of the global economy is needed to prevent, instead of create, trade 
imbalances, thus averting high indebtedness and unemployment. How we organize the 
global economy to close the gaps in competitiveness is the principal task of our 
generation and a fertile area for future research.  
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